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SUBJECT: (Optional)						
FROM: Robert M. Gates Deputy Director for Intelligence		EXTENSION	DDI-02390/84			
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and	DATE		OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (A)		
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DDI-02390/84

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Director

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FROM

: Robert M. Gates

Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Critical Intelligence Needs

REFERENCE

: Executive Director Memorandum, Same Subject,

dated 10 April 1984

- 1. We have reviewed the CIPC staff-prepared list of "critical intelligence needs" and found it to be of little use in the CIPC study context. It is not a Community statement of highly critical intelligence needs in response to a request from the DCI; it is only a compilation of disparate inputs from some elements of the Community -- in essence, a shopping list of important topics for the Community to be addressing. The list is not comprehensive, and the topics listed vary substantially in terms of scope and importance.
- 2. We are concerned about the potential number of CIPC studies that could result from such an approach to identify highly critical intelligence needs. There will be, in our view, an adverse impact on the Community of increasing the number of topics which are not really "critical intelligence problems." There are high costs in supporting CIPC studies, which take analysts and other specialists away from their primary duties frequently for long periods. Furthermore, each study makes resource recommendations analytic and collection. If numerous topics are tagged "critical," and recommendations made, then there will be no practical sense of real priorities.
- 3. Accordingly, we do not believe it appropriate for the CIPC principals to attempt to review the CIPC staff's list at the 23 April meeting. Rather, we suggest that the list be remanded to


All Paragraphs in this Document are Classified SECRET

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SUBJECT: Critical Intelligence Needs


the CIPC staff for complete revision so that it contains those few "critical intelligence problems" -- perhaps no more than 10 -- which could be considered as candidate topics for CIPC study. After that step is completed, the CIPC could than determine which topics should be submitted to the DCI and DDCI for their consideration. This process should produce no more than one or two topics that are critical and warrant CIPC attention.



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SUBJECT: Critical Intelligence Needs

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The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3802 30 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Eloise R. Page

Chairman

SUBJECT:

Critical Intelligence Needs (U)

- l. In response to your recent request, the CIPC members have identified a large list of highly critical intelligence needs, including requirements against the terrorist threat. (C)
- 2. Since some of the recommendations relate to subjects the CIPC presently has under study, i.e, terrorism, these recommendations will be passed to the working groups for their consideration and incorporation into their respective studies, as appropriate. (C)
- 3. In order to present the recommended critical intelligence needs in a comprehensive manner we have displayed them in two different forms. At Attachment A is a summarized listing of the recommendations by agency. Attachment B, however, consolidates the proposed critical intelligence requirements on a target/topic basis. (U)
- 4. The two attachments have been furnished to the CIPC members, and the subject will be included on the April agenda for Committee review and discussion. Subsequently, the Committee will provide you with a prioritized list of those critical intelligence needs that warrant CIPC attention and specific recommendations for addressing them. We will also provide alternative recommendations on how the remaining critical intelligence needs they addressed and what organizations should addresse them. (C)

should be addressed and what organizations should addresss them. (C)

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Eloise R. Page

Attachments:

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THIS MEMORANDUM MAY BE REGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL UPON REMOVAL OF CAVEATS AND ATTACHMENTS.

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
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28 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

- 1. Thanks for your response to my inquiry. Let me compliment the committee and its working groups for the work which they have accomplished thus far.
- 2. I have seen the Soviet strategic cruise missile study and found it impressive. I am asking the NFIC to table it for an early NFIC meeting.
- 3. You have an important and critical task in evaluating collection strategy mixes in relation to developing national strategy and intelligence needs. As you know, there is no easy or permanent answer to this continuously vexing problem. In the final analysis, this will have to be dealt with by the chiefs of the collection units in the community. We will be meeting to discuss this among other things next Monday. It would be useful if you could crystalize any preliminary thoughts on the substance of the mode of attack and time table for dealing with this problem for me to air at that meeting.
- 4. I would like to see the committee formulate a list of what the members see as other highly critical intelligence needs. As a starter, what collection needs and more effective modes of attack do you see to deal with the increasingly urgent, complex and far-reaching terrorist threat?

William J. Casey

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